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SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS,
2007-2008
American Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission")
complied with the requirements of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"),
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA") in an order denying in part, dismissing in part, and deferring in
part a petition seeking to protect migratory birds from collisions with commu-
nications towers in the Gulf Coast region.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
vacated the Order. The court found that the Commission appropriately de-
ferred consideration of its compliance with MBTA to an ongoing nationwide
proceeding in a separate docket. Nonetheless, the court held that the Commis-
sion neither satisfied its obligations under NEPA and ESA to adequately estab-
lish the communications towers' potential environmental impact, nor provided
adequate public notice of pending tower applications.
History: On August 26, 2002, the American Bird Conservancy and the For-
est Conservation Council ("Petitioners") requested that the Commission in-
quire into the effects of "tower kill" on migratory bird populations in the Gulf
Coast region. Specifically, Petitioners requested that the Commission: (1) com-
ply with MBTA to reduce or eliminate migratory bird mortality rates at Gulf
Cost tower sites; (2) prepare an environmental impact statement under NEPA
analyzing the potential effects the towers could have on migratory birds; (3)
consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Services ("FWS") in accor-
dance with ESA to determine the towers' potential impact on bird species; and
(4) provide public notice of Gulf Coast tower applications before granting
them.
While Petitioners' request was pending, the Commission initiated a nation-
wide proceeding in a separate docket to determine the effects of communica-
tions towers on migratory birds throughout the United States. On August 20,
2003, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry to compile factual evidence
and investigate possible legal ramifications concerning this issue. In re Effects
of Communications Towers on Migratory Birds, Notice of Inquiry, 18 F.C.C.R.
16,938 (Aug. 8, 2003). In April 2005, Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
seeking to compel the Commission to act on their request. After five days of
oral argument, the Commission issued the Order in which the migratory bird
issue would be analyzed under a separate docket examining the towers' impact
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at a nationwide level. In re Petition by Forest Conservation Council, American
Bird Conservancy, and Friends of the Earth for National Environmental Policy
Act Compliance, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 4462 (Apr.
11, 2006). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the mandamus case as
moot.
In May 2006, Petitioners sought review of the Order. The court found Peti-
tioners had standing as members of organizations that engage in recreational
birdwatching and research on birds in the Gulf Coast region.
Discussion: MBTA makes it unlawful to "pursue, hunt, take, capture [or]
kill" any migratory bird. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000). Petitioners contended that the
Commission unlawfully "takes" migratory birds when birds die in collisions
with Commission-licensed towers. The Commission responded in the Order
that it was examining its obligation under MBTA to reduce or eliminate the
number of migratory birds colliding with towers under a nationwide proceed-
ing in a separate docket. The court reasoned that the Commission acted rea-
sonably when it deferred consideration of the issue because the nationwide
proceeding was designed to collect additional relevant information regarding
an event that occurs throughout the United States.
Under NEPA, in major federal actions that significantly affect the environ-
ment, a federal agency must prepare an environmental impact statement that
studies adverse environmental effects of the agency's proposed actions and
examines potential alternatives. NEPA provides that federal actions impacting
the environment can be divided into three categories: (1) those that require an
environmental impact statement; (2) those that require a less rigorous envi-
ronmental assessment; and (3) those that are "categorically excluded" and do
not require an environmental impact statement or an environmental assess-
ment. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2) (2006).
In accordance with Commission regulations concerning NEPA implementa-
tion, communications towers are "categorically excluded" from an environ-
mental analysis because towers are "deemed individually and cumulatively to
have no significant effect on the quality of the human environment." 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.1306(a) (2006). However, interested persons can request an analysis from
the Commission under NEPA even for "categorically excluded" actions by
filing a petition that details a justification to consider the environmental im-
pact. Id § 1.1307(c). After receiving notification of a request for an analysis,
the Commission must require the tower applicant to prepare an environmental
assessment if it determines the actions "may have a significant environmental
impact." Id. § 1.1308(b). The environmental assessment, in turn, provides the
Commission with the basis to determine the necessity of an environmental im-
pact statement. Id. § 1.13 14(a).
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In the Order, the Commission maintained that an environmental impact
statement was not required due to a lack of specific evidence concerning the
towers' impact on the human environment and a lack of consensus among sci-
entists regarding the towers' effect on migratory birds.
The court rejected both of these arguments, finding that the Order applied a
far too stringent application of NEPA's standard for requiring an environ-
mental impact statement. The court reasoned that the Order's demand for de-
finitive evidence and a scientific consensus was inconsistent with Commission
regulations and NEPA. The scientific consensus that the Order required con-
tradicted NEPA's standard that the actions may have an environmental impact.
Additionally, a precondition of a scientific certainty contravened NEPA's re-
quirement that federal agencies predict the environmental impact of a proposed
action before the full effects are known.
NEPA states that the Commission had a duty to produce an environmental
assessment if the actions in question "may" have a significant environmental
impact. Because the record demonstrated that the towers "may" have an impact
on the environment, the court found that the threshold to prepare an environ-
mental assessment had been met. Accordingly, the court determined that the
Commission had a duty to at least complete an environmental assessment be-
fore rejecting Petitioners request for an environmental impact statement, and
vacated the NEPA part of the Order.
The ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely
to jeopardize the existence of endangered or threatened species, or destroy or
adversely affect critical habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). Federal agen-
cies also have a duty to participate in formal consultation with the FWS if their
actions "may affect" endangered or threatened species or critical habitats. 50
C.F.R. § 402.14(a)-(b) (2006).
Petitioners requested that the Commission formally consult with the FWS to
determine the towers' cumulative effects on endangered and threatened spe-
cies. The Commission declined, commenting that the evidence showed that
towers did not have a cumulative environmental effect distinct from their indi-
vidual impact on the environment. The court found this explanation inade-
quate. The Commission did not explain in the Order how Petitioners could
have demonstrated a sufficient environmental impact under the ESA to compel
an FWS consultation. Finding the Commission's standard for producing suffi-
cient evidence too strict, the court vacated the ESA part of the Order.
The Council of Environmental Quality's regulations require federal agencies
to make diligent efforts to notify the public during NEPA procedures. 40
C.F.R. § 1506.6(a) (2006). Petitioners requested that the Commission provide
adequate notice of proposed tower applications to allow the opportunity to seek
environmental review before any actions commenced. However, the Commis-
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sion provided public notice only after approving the tower applications. The
court found that, in doing so, the Commission was preventing public participa-
tion in NEPA procedures, and therefore vacated the notice part of the Order.
With the exception of the deferral of compliance with the MBTA, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the Order
and remanded the case to the Commission in accordance with the requirements
of NEPA and ESA. The court noted that the Commission could resolve Peti-
tioners' request either separately or as part of the nationwide proceeding.
Summarized by Alan Kaminer
Qwest Services Corporation v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
Issue: Whether the FCC's Order, In re Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card
Services, 21 F.C.C.R. 7290 (June 1, 2006), determining that phone calls made
from two different types of pre-paid calling cards offer "telecommunications
services," thereby subjecting the providers of those cards to access charges,
Universal Service Fund contributions, and other obligations under the Com-
munications Act, should be applied retroactively from the release date of the
Order to Internet Protocol ("IP")-transport cards but not menu-driven cards.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that there was no manifest injustice in applying the Order retroac-
tively to IP-transport cards. The court further held that nothing in the record
justified the Commission's decision to foreclose retroactive application of the
Order's statutory interpretation to menu-driven cards in the calculation of a
provider's liability for access charges. Therefore, the court vacated the Order
as it purported to bar such an application to the menu-driven cards.
History: Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, providers of telecommunications services are
regulated as common carriers, whereas providers of information services are
not. In 2003, AT&T petitioned the Federal Communications Commission
("Commission") for a declaratory ruling finding that its "enhanced" pre-paid
calling cards were "jurisdictionally interstate" and provided information ser-
vices. AT&T then subsequently amended its petition to include menu-driven
cards and IP-transport cards for the FCC's consideration.
In 2005, the Commission released an order in response to that petition. The
Commission determined that the "enhanced" cards in the original petition were
telecommunication services and that the calls made with them are intrastate
when they originate and end in the same state, regardless of the call's actual
route. However, the Commission declined to extend its declaratory ruling to
menu-driven and IP-transport cards. Instead, the Commission opened a new
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docket to resolve those questions and requested comment on the proper classi-
fication of menu-driven and IP-transport cards.
The Commission released its declaratory ruling on June 30, 2006, holding
that IP-transport and menu-driven cards "are telecommunications services" and
thus subject to regulation as such. The Commission stated that the declaratory
ruling was "a form of adjudication" and recognized that "[g]enerally adjudica-
tory decisions are applied retroactively." They then applied the general rule to
IP-transport cards but not menu-driven cards "to avoid manifest injustice."
The Petitioners, iBasis and Qwest, did not challenge the substantive merits
of this decision; rather, they attacked the Commission's decision as to the ret-
roactive applicability of that decision. iBasis contested the decision to make
the Order retroactive as to IP-transport cards, and Qwest contested the decision
to make it prospective only as to menu-driven cards. AT&T and Verizon inter-
vened in opposition to Qwest.
Discussion: iBasis argued that the Order announced a rule rather than an ad-
judicatory decision and thus it could not be applied retroactively. In the alter-
native, iBasis argued that even if the Order was an adjudication, its retroactive
application to the IP-transport cards used before the release of the Order works
a manifest injustice. The court rejected both of these contentions. First, the
court determined that although the process that resulted in this Order began as
a rulemaking process, the Commission split the proceeding into a dual one,
half adjudicatory and half rulemaking. As such, the Order as applied to IP-
transport cards was adjudicatory and thus applied retroactively. Secondly, the
court held that the Order did not work manifest injustice. The court then cited
the Commission's determination that the IP-transport cards offer no other ca-
pability than the ability to make a telephone call, a process that the Commis-
sion has always treated as a telecommunications service. Furthermore, the
Commission had already held, prior to the release of the Order at issue, that
IP-transport of traditional long-distance calls did not change the regulatory
classification of the service at issue.
The court next determined the retroactive application of the ruling to menu-
driven calling cards. First, the Commission determined whether Qwest had
standing to challenge the Order on this basis. The court discussed the fact that
the Commission's opinion on retroactivity is not the final word, and that dis-
putes over the collection of tariff charges often proceed before state agencies or
in federal district court, not in front of the Commission. However, the court
held that Qwest's continuing dispute with Verizon created sufficient injuries to
sustain Qwest's standing in the present case.
The court then considered whether the FCC's prospective application of the
Order was in error. In issuing the Order, the Commission believed that retro-
activity would work a manifest injustice for four reasons: (1) a baseline lack of
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clarity in the law; (2) a further obfuscation of the applicable law supposedly
wrought by the Commission's NPRM; (3) the intervention and clarifying force
of the Supreme Court's decision in Brand X; and (4) the possible reliance of
menu-driven prepaid calling card providers on all uncertainty. The court found
the Commission's arguments unpersuasive. The Commission offered no plau-
sible grounds to overcome the presumption of retroactivity and offered no
other reason for precluding retroactive application of statutory interpretation.
Therefore, the court vacated the Order with regard to the prospective-only ap-
plicability to menu-based calling cards.
Summarized by Joseph Carlson
Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 508 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") failure
to adopt an order granting or denying the Verizon telephone company's ("Ver-
izon") petition for forbearance from regulatory requirements affecting its
broadband service has the effect of denying the petition, and whether a grant of
a petition for forbearance as a result of the Commissioner's deadlock consti-
tutes judicially reviewable agency action.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that a
deadlocked Commission vote constitutes neither an order nor an agency action,
thereby making the grant of Verizon's petition for forbearance unreviewable.
History: Verizon filed a petition to exempt its broadband services from sev-
eral regulatory requirements in Title II of the Communications Act of 1934
("Communications Act" or "the Act"). On this issue, the Commissioners were
unable to come to a consensus before the statutory deadline. As such, the peti-
tion was deemed granted per 47 U.S.C. § 160(c). Sprint Nextel and other com-
munications companies ("Petitioners") sought judicial review of the grant.
Discussion: The Petitioners argued that a deadlocked vote effectively denied
the petition. Alternatively, they argued that a grant resulting from a failure to
deny within the statutory period constituted agency action that should be found
arbitrary and capricious and, therefore vacated. The court began by noting that
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") renders final agency action subject
to judicial review by the appellate courts.
In arguing that a deadlock vote has the effect of denying a petition for for-
bearance, Sprint cited similar provisions from both the courts and the legisla-
ture that provide for the preservation of the status quo in the event of an equal
split among voters. The court, however, failed to see how the FCC acted in this
matter; on the contrary, the FCC's lack of action triggered the statutory provi-
sion that deemed the petition granted. The legal effect of the statutory provi-
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sion at issue here, 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), was created by Congress in the event of
an FCC deadlock. Therefore, it is Congress's action that grants the petition, not
the FCC's.
The court found support for its reasoning in AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 369 F.3d
554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), in which the D.C. Circuit addressed the expiration of
regulatory safeguards for long distance telephone service providers. The statute
in that case had a similar sunset provision in which the regulation would cease
to exist after three years unless the FCC extended it by rule or order. 47 U.S.C.
§272(0(1) (2000). The FCC issued a public notice that it would allow the stat-
ute to sunset for Verizon, and AT&T petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.
The court in AT&T Corp. held that the decision to allow the sunset of the regu-
lation was made by Congress by operation of law. AT&T, 369 F.3d at 559. The
court in the present matter found that the same holds true for forbearance pro-
vision-when the Commission failed to act in a timely fashion, Congress's
decision took effect.
The court also found that the FCC's press release announcing the grant of
Verizon's petition of forbearance did not itself constitute an agency action. In
comparing the press release to the public notice in AT&T Corp., the court
found that it merely served an informational purpose and imposed no obliga-
tions. Furthermore, the court found that the Commissioner's individual state-
ments accompanying the press release were not reviewable as they are not
FCC actions.
The fact that the FCC took no action is further accentuated by a provision in
the APA that instructs courts to set aside agency actions found to be arbitrary
and capricious or an abuse of discretion. It is not enough for the court merely
to agree with the agency action's outcome. The court must also agree with the
reasoning behind the decision or it may send the decision back to the agency to
either fix the reasoning or change the outcome. In this case, regarding the for-
bearance provision, the court found that the FCC did not provide reasoning in
support of the Commissioners' individual statements that accompanied the
press release.
Lastly, the court addressed the Petitioners' concerns that failure to have ju-
dicial review of this forbearance provision will allow the FCC to evade any
judicial review of future forbearance petitions by simply refraining to act on
them. The Commissioners are appointed by the President with the consent of
the Senate, and absent any evidence of abuse of the provision it will be as-
sumed that FCC review of forbearance petitions is proper.
Summarized by Jonathan Campbell
20081

